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Abstract
The dual reduction process, introduced by Myerson, allows to reduce a
finite game into a smaller dimensional game such that any equilibrium of the
reduced game is an equilibrium of the original game. This holds both for Nash
equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. We present examples of applications
of dual reduction and argue that this is a useful tool to study Nash equilibria
and correlated equilibria. We then investigate its properties.
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1 Introduction
Dual reduction is a reduction process for finite games defined by Roger Myer-
son (1997), which generalizes elimination of dominated strategies. It takes its
roots in the proofs of existence of correlated equilibria of Hart and Schmeidler
(1989) and Nau and McCardle (1990). Dual reduction’s main property is that
any Nash or correlated equilibrium of the reduced game is an equilibrium of
the original game. Moreover, by iterative dual reduction, any finite game may
be reduced to an elementary game; that is, to a game in which all incentive
constraints defining correlated equilibria can be satisfied as strict inequalities
in a correlated equilibrium. Myerson (1997) also showed that, while some
games may be reduced in several ways, this ambiguity is alleviated if we focus
on a specific class of dual reductions, called full dual reductions.
The aim of this article is to show that dual reduction is a powerful tool to
study Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria, and to study its properties.
It is organized as follows: in the next section, we recall the basics of dual
reduction. Section 3 gives examples of applications of dual reduction: we first
give an elementary proof of the fact that a unique correlated equilibrium is a
Nash equilibrium. The proof is elementary in that it relies entirely on linear
programming. We then show that dual reduction allows to prove the existence
of Nash equilibria with special properties and to study the geometry of the
set of correlated equilibria. In section 4, the properties of dual reduction are
investigated. For instance, we show that rescaling the payoffs does not change
the ways in which a game may be reduced; that in all full dual reductions,
all strategies that have probability zero in all correlated equilibria are elimi-
nated ; and that any zero-sum game and any game with a unique correlated
equilibrium is reduced by all full dual reductions into a game with a unique
pure strategy profile. We also show that, in almost all two-player games, the
iterative reduction process is uniquely defined, as long as we focus on full dual
reductions. Finally, a proof is given in the appendix. Unless stated otherwise,
all references to Myerson are to Myerson (1997).
Notations. As Myerson, we denote a finite game in strategic form by
Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (Ui)i∈N )
where N is the set of players, Ci the set of pure strategies of player i, and Ui :
×j∈NCj → R the utility function of player i. The set of pure strategy profiles
is denoted by C = ×j∈NCj . For each player i, we let C−i = ×j∈N\{i}Cj. If
c = (cj)j∈N is a pure strategy profile and di a pure strategy of player i, we let
(c−i, di) denote the pure strategy profile that differs from c only in that the
i-component is di.
For any finite set S, we let |S| denote its cardinal and ∆(S) the set of
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probability distributions over S. A correlated strategy of the players in N is
an element of ∆(C). Thus, µ = (µ(c))c∈C is a correlated strategy if and only
if µ(c) ≥ 0 for any c in C and
∑
c∈C µ(c) = 1.
Let µ be a correlated strategy. Assume that before play, a mediator draws
a pure strategy profile c with probability µ(c) and then privately recommends
ci to player i, for every i in N . The correlated strategy µ is a correlated
equilibrium (Aumann, 1974, 1987) if no player has an incentive to deviate
unilaterally from these recommendations. That is, µ is a correlated equilib-
rium if and only if it satisfies the following incentive constraints:
∑
c−i∈C−i
µ(c) [Ui(c−i, di)− Ui(c)] ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ N,∀ci ∈ Ci,∀di ∈ Ci (1)
For every i in N , we let Cci ⊂ Ci denote the set of pure strategies of player i
which have positive marginal probability in at least one correlated equilibrium.
For any mapping αi : Ci → ∆(Ci) and any ci, di in Ci, we may write αi ∗ci
instead of αi(ci) to denote the image of ci by this mapping, and αi(di|ci)
instead of (αi ∗ ci)(di) to denote the probability of di in the mixed strategy
αi ∗ ci. This is for consistency with Myerson.
2 Basics of dual reduction
Unless stated otherwise, all results of this section are due to Myerson.
Dual vectors. Assume that before play a mediator privately recom-
mends a pure strategy to each player, who can either obey or deviate from
this recommendation. The behavior of player i can then be described by a
mapping αi : Ci → ∆(Ci), which associates to every pure strategy ci the ran-
domized strategy αi ∗ ci that she will play if recommended ci. The mapping
αi may be called a deviation plan for player i. If a mediator tries to imple-
ment a pure strategy profile c, then player i’s gain from deviating unilaterally
according to αi instead of following the mediator’s recommendation is
Di(c, αi) := Ui(c−i, αi ∗ ci)− Ui(c)
Let α = (αi)i∈N be a profile of deviation plans and let D(c, α) denote the sum
of the above gains over the set of players:
D(c, α) :=
∑
i∈N
Di(c, αi) =
∑
i∈N
[Ui(c−i, αi ∗ ci)− Ui(c)]
Definition. A dual vector is a profile of deviation plans α = (αi)i∈N such
that D(c, α) ≥ 0 for every pure strategy profile c in C.
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Dual vectors arise from the linear programming proofs of existence of cor-
related equilibria (Hart and Schmeidler, 1989; Nau and McCardle, 1990). Any
game has at least one dual vector. Indeed, letting αi ∗ ci = ci for all i in N
and all ci in Ci defines a dual vector. We call it the trivial dual vector.
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How to reduce a game using a dual vector. Let α be a dual
vector. The mapping αi : Ci → ∆(Ci) induces a Markov chain on Ci. This
Markov chain partitions Ci into a set of transient states and disjoint minimal
absorbing sets.2 Let us say that a mixed strategy σi of player i is αi-stationary
if αi ∗ σi = σi, where
αi ∗ σi =
∑
ci∈Ci
σi(ci)(αi ∗ ci)
From the basic theory of Markov chains, it follows that for every minimal
absorbing set Bi ⊂ Ci, there is a unique αi-stationary mixed stategy with
support in Bi. Let Ci/αi denote the set of such αi-stationary strategies with
support in a minimal absorbing set. The α-reduced game, denoted by Γ/α,
is the game with the same set of players and the same utility functions as in
Γ, but in which, for every i in N , the pure strategy set of player i is Ci/αi:
Γ/α = {N, (Ci/αi)i∈N , (Ui)i∈N}
The reduction thus operates by eliminating some strategies and grouping other
strategies together.
More precisely, if ci ∈ Ci is a transient state for the Markov chain in-
duced by αi, then ci is eliminated. That is, σi(ci) = 0 for all σi in Ci/αi.
If ci is αi-stationary (i.e. αi ∗ ci = ci), then ci is kept as a pure strat-
egy: ci ∈ Ci/αi. Finally, if ci is neither transient nor stationary, then ci
is grouped with the other strategies of its minimal absorbing set, so that:
∃σi ∈ Ci/αi, σi 6= ci and σi(ci) > 0.
1To see how dual vectors arise from the proofs of existence of correlated equilibria, consider
the auxiliary zero-sum game in which the maximizer chooses a pure strategy profile c of Γ, the
minimizer a profile of deviation plans α = (αi)i∈N , and the payoff is −D(c, α). In this game (a
variant of Hart and Schmeidler’s (1989) auxiliary game), a randomized strategy of the maximizer is
a correlated strategy of Γ, and it guarantees a payoff of 0 if and only if it is a correlated equilibrium.
Thus, to prove existence of correlated equilibria, it suffices to show that the value of the auxiliary
game is at least 0. In fact, it is exactly 0 because the minimizer can guarantee 0 by choosing the
trivial deviation vector. It follows that dual vectors may be defined as the optimal strategies of
the minimizer in this auxiliary game. Similarly, Myerson introduces dual vectors as the optimal
solutions of the dual of a linear program whose optimal solutions are the correlated equilibria.
2A nonempty subset Bi of Ci is a minimal absorbing set if : (i) for every ci in Bi, αi ∗ ci has
support in Bi and (ii) it contains no nonempty proper subset satisfying (i).
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Definition. A dual reduction of Γ is any α-reduced game Γ/α where α is a
dual vector. An iterative dual reduction of Γ is any game Γ/α1/α2/ . . . where
each αk is a dual vector for Γ/α1/α2/ . . . /αk−1. (The expression “dual reduc-
tion” may refer either to a reduced game or to the reduction technique.)
Let C/α = ×i∈NCi/αi denote the set of pure strategy profiles of the
reduced game Γ/α. So the set of correlated strategies of the reduced game
is ∆(C/α). Any correlated strategy µ in C/α can be mapped back to a
Γ-equivalent correlated strategy µ¯ in the natural way:
µ¯(c) =
∑
σ∈C/α
µ(σ)σ(c) ∀c ∈ C
(the mapping µ 7→ µ¯ may be shown to be injective). Myerson’s main result
is that if µ is a correlated equilibrium of a dual reduction of Γ, then µ¯ is a
correlated equilibrium of Γ. The same result holds for Nash equilibrium.
The main step of the proof is to show that, if σ is a mixed strategy profile
such that, for every j 6= i, σj is αj-stationary, then Ui(σ) ≤ Ui(σ−i, αi ∗ σi).
The derivation of this fact will be used in sections 3 and 4 and so we recall it:
for every j in N ,
∑
c∈C
σ(c)Dj(c, αj) = Uj(σ−j , αj ∗ σj)− Uj(σ)
Indeed, both sides of the equation represent the expected gain for player j
from deviating according to αj , when all other players obey a mediator who
is trying to implement σ. Summing over the set of players N , we get
∑
c∈C
σ(c)D(c, α) =
∑
j∈N
[Uj(σ−j, αj ∗ σj)− Uj(σ)] (2)
If αj ∗ σj = σj for all j 6= i, then (2) boils down to
∑
c∈C
σ(c)D(c, α) = Ui(σ−i, αi ∗ σi)− Ui(σ) (3)
Since α is a dual vector, D(c, α) ≥ 0 for all c, hence the left hand side of (3)
is nonnegative. Thus, (3) ⇒ Ui(σ) ≤ Ui(σ−i, αi ∗ σi).
Jeopardization and reduction to elementary games A game is el-
ementary (Myerson) if it has a correlated equilibrium µ which satisfies all
incentive constraints with strict inequality:
∑
c∈C
µ(c) [Ui(c−i, di)− Ui(c)] > 0 ∀i ∈ N,∀ci 6= di (4)
If µ satisfies (4), then for any correlated strategy µ′ with full support and
for any ǫ small enough, (1 − ǫ)µ + ǫµ′ is a strict correlated equilibrium with
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full support; conversely, any strict correlated equilibrium with full support
satisfies (4). So, elementary games can also be defined as those games having
a strict correlated equilibrium with full support.3
Myerson shows that a game may be strictly reduced if and only if it is not
elementary; this implies that, though many games are not elementary (e.g.,
Matching Pennies), any game may be reduced to an elementary game by it-
erative dual reduction. The proof is based on the concept of jeopardization
and proposition 1 below: a strong complementary slackness property which
we will use extensively.
Definition. Let ci and di be pure strategies of player i. The strategy di
jeopardizes ci if, in every correlated equilibrium µ, the incentive constraint
stipulating that player i should not gain by deviating from ci to di is tight.
That is, ∑
c−i∈C−i
µ(c) [Ui(c−i, di)− Ui(c)] = 0
Proposition 1. There exists a dual vector α such that αi(di|ci) > 0 if and
only if di jeopardizes ci.
Full dual reduction Let us say that a dual vector is full (or has full
support) if it is positive in every component that is positive in at least one dual
vector. By proposition 1, for any full dual vector α and any pure strategies
ci and di in Ci, αi(di|ci) > 0 if and only if di jeopardizes ci. Existence of full
dual vectors follows from the convexity of the set of dual vectors. A full dual
reduction of Γ is any reduced game Γ/α where α is a full dual vector.
The interest of full dual reductions is not only that there are less full
dual reductions than dual reductions. It also lies in the following properties,
which remain implicit in Myerson: any full dual vectors, having the same
positive components, induce the same minimal absorbing sets. Therefore, in
any full dual reduction, the pure strategies which are eliminated (resp. kept
as pure strategies, grouped together) are the same. Moreover, in any full dual
reduction, there are weakly less pure strategies remaining than in any other
dual reduction of the same game. That is, if α is a full dual vector and β
is any dual vector, then |Ci/αi| ≤ |Ci/βi|. This follows from the fact that
any component that is positive in βi is also positive in αi, and from basic
properties of Markov chains.
3A correlated equilibrium µ has full support if µ(c) > 0 for all c in C. It is strict if the incentive
constraint (1) is satisfied with strict inequality, for any i in N , any ci with positive marginal
probability in µ, and any di 6= ci.
6
3 Some applications of dual reduction
This section aims at showing, by way of examples, that dual reduction is a
useful tool to study properties of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria.
A unique correlated equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium: an elemen-
tary proof Consider first the fact that, if a game has a unique correlated
equilibrium, then this correlated equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. Of course,
as existence of correlated equilibria, this follows from the existence of Nash
equilibria and the fact that any Nash equilibrium is a correlated equilibrium.
But, as for existence of correlated equilibria (Hart and Schmeidler, 1989; Nau
and McCardle, 1990), it would be nice to find a more direct proof, relying
solely on linear programming. Dual reduction provides such a proof.
Indeed, let Γ be a game with a unique correlated equilibrium. By iterative
dual reduction, Γ may be reduced to an elementary game Γe. Since Γe is ele-
mentary (i.e. has a strict correlated equilibrium with full support), it follows
that either Γe has an infinity of correlated equilibria, or Γe has a unique strat-
egy profile. Since Γ has a unique correlated equilibrium and since different
correlated equilibria of Γe induce different correlated equilibria of Γ, the first
case is ruled out. Therefore, Γe has a unique strategy profile, hence trivially
a Nash equilibrium. This implies that Γ has a Nash equilibrium hence that
the unique correlated equilibrium of Γ is a Nash equilibrium.
This proof relies on: a) the definition of dual reduction, which requires the
Minimax theorem and existence of stationary distributions for finite Markov
chains; and b) the fact that any game may be reduced to an elementary game,
which Myerson proved through the strong complementary property of linear
programs. Since the existence of stationary distributions for finite Markov
chains can be deduced from the Minimax theorem, the above proof relies
solely on linear duality. In particular no fixed point theorem is used.4
Equilibria with special properties. Dual reduction also allows us to
prove existence of equilibria with special properties. For instance:
Proposition 2. In any finite game, there exists a Nash equilibrium σ such
that, for every player i and every pure strategy ci with marginal probability
zero in all correlated equilibria, ci is not a best response to σ−i.
4The fact that the existence of stationary distributions for finite Markov chains can be deduced
from the Minimax theorem is mentioned by Mertens et al (1994, ex. 9, p.41). To see this, let
M = (mij) denote a stochastic matrix (that is, the mij are nonnegative and each columns sums
to unity). Applying the lemma of Hart and Schmeidler (1989, p.19) with ajk = mkj and u a
basis vector, we get that there exists a probability vector x such that Mx = x. Since Hart and
Schmeidler prove this lemma via the Minimax theorem, this shows that existence of stationary
distributions for finite Markov chains can indeed be deduced from the Minimax theorem.
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We first need to introduce a new class of dual vectors.
Definition. A dual vector is strong if for every pure strategy profile c in C
with probability zero in all correlated equilibria,
D(c, α) =
∑
i∈N
[Ui(c−i, αi ∗ ci)− Ui(c)] > 0
(the first equality simply recalls the definition of D(c, α)). Existence of strong
dual vectors follows from Nau and McCardle’s (1990) proof of existence of
correlated equilibria. Due to the linearity of the conditions defining dual
vectors and their refinements, any strictly convex combination of a full dual
vector and of a strong dual vector is a dual vector which is both strong and
full. This implies that there is at least one strong and full dual vector. It is
actually easy to show that a dual vector is both strong and full if and only if
it belongs to the relative interior of the (convex) set of dual vectors.
The following lemma is a variant of Myerson’s lemma 1:
Lemma 3. Let i ∈ N . Let α be a strong dual vector. Let σ−i ∈ ×j 6=i∆(Cj).
Assume that for every j 6= i, the mixed strategy σj is αj-stationary. For
any pure strategy ci of player i with marginal probability zero in all correlated
equilibria, Ui(σ−i, ci) < Ui(σ−i, αi ∗ ci).
Proof. Let σ = (σ−i, ci). Since ci has marginal probability zero in all cor-
related equilibria, it follows that every strategy profile c with σ(c) > 0 has
probability zero in all correlated equilibria. By definition of strong dual vec-
tors, this implies that D(c, α) > 0. Therefore
∑
c∈C
σ(c)D(c, α) > 0
But since for every j 6= i, σj is αj-stationary, it follows that equation (3) is
satisfied. Therefore
0 <
∑
c∈C
σ(c)D(c, α) = Ui(σ−i, αi ∗ σi)− Ui(σ) = Ui(σ−i, αi ∗ ci)− Ui(σ−i, ci)
(for the last equality, recall that σi = ci). The result follows.
We now prove proposition 2: let α be a strong dual vector and σ a Nash
equilibrium of Γ/α, hence of Γ. By construction of Γ/α, for every j in N , σj
is αj-stationary. Therefore, by lemma 3, if ci has marginal probability zero in
all correlated equililibria, then ci is not a best-response to σ−i. So σ satisfies
the desired property. This completes the proof.
A corollary of proposition 2 is that, if a game has a unique correlated
equilibrium, then this correlated equilibrium is a quasi-strict Nash equilib-
rium. This can also be shown directly as in (Viossat, 2007).
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Tight games Consider the class of tight games, introduced by Nitzan (2005):
Definition 4. A game is tight if in every correlated equilibrium µ, all incen-
tives constraints are tight:
∑
c−i∈C−i
µ(c)[Ui(c−i, di)− Ui(c)] = 0 ∀i ∈ N,∀ci ∈ Ci,∀di ∈ Ci (5)
Nitzan (2005) shows that, for any positive integer n, there is an open set
of tight games within the set of n× n bimatrix games.
Proposition 5. Any tight game has a completely mixed Nash equilibrium
Proof. The definition of tight games may be rephrased as follows: a game is
tight if di jeopardizes ci, for every player i and every couple of pure strategies
(ci, di) in Ci×Ci. Therefore, if α is a full dual vector of a tight game Γ, then
for every couple of pure strategies (ci, di) in Ci × Ci, we have αi(di|ci) > 0.
Thus, for the Markov chain induced by αi, there is a unique minimal absorbing
set: the whole of Ci. Therefore, in the full dual reduction Γ/α, all strategies
of player i are grouped together, and this for every i in N . It follows that Γ/α
has a unique strategy profile σ, which is a completely mixed strategy profile
of Γ; furthermore, since σ is trivially a Nash equilibrium of Γ/α, it is a Nash
equilibrium of Γ.
A class of games introduced by Nau et al (2004). Recall that Cci
denotes the set of pure strategies of player i with positive marginal probability
in at least one correlated equilibrium. Let us say that a game is pretight if,
in every correlated equilibrium µ, every incentive constraint (1) with ci and
di in C
c
i is tight. That is,
∑
c−i∈C−i
µ(c)[Ui(c−i, di)− Ui(c)] = 0 ∀i ∈ N,∀ci ∈ C
c
i ,∀di ∈ C
c
i (6)
This condition, which is weaker than (5), has been introduced by Nau et al
(2004). Recall that the inequalities defining the set of correlated equilibria
are linear in µ, so that the set of correlated equilibria is a convex polytope.
Nau et al (2004, proposition 2) showed that in any finite game, all Nash
equilibria belong to the relative boundary of this polytope unless: (a) the game
is pretight, and (b) there exists a Nash equilibrium with support ×i∈NC
c
i .
Dual reduction allows to show that (a) implies (b).
Proposition 6. Any pretight game has a quasi-strict Nash equilibrium with
support ×i∈NC
c
i .
The proof of proposition 6 uses results from section 4, and so we postpone
it to the appendix. Proposition 6 does not only show that Nau et al’s condition
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(a) implies their condition (b), but also that any pretight game has a quasi-
strict Nash equilibrium: a nontrivial fact, since for n ≥ 3, not all n-player
games have a quasi-strict Nash equilibrium (van Damme, 1991). Moreover,
from proposition 6, a converse of Nau et al’s result may be obtained. Namely,
if a game is pretight, then there is a Nash equilibrium in the relative interior
of the correlated equilibrium polytope (Viossat, 2006).
Dimension of the correlated equilibrium polytope. We now turn to
another property of the correlated equilibrium polytope. It is well known that
in generic 2 × 2 games, the correlated equilibrium polytope has dimension 0
or 3, but not 1 nor 2. This might seem a peculiarity of 2× 2 games, but dual
reduction allows to show that in generic finite games, there are dimensions
that the correlated equilibrium polytope cannot have:
Proposition 7. In a generic finite game in which at least two players have
at least two pure strategies, the correlated equilibrium polytope does not have
dimension |C| − 2.5
We first need to show that, unless a pure strategy is dominated or equiv-
alent to a mixed strategy, there is no dual reduction which simply consists in
eliminating this strategy (the converse has been shown by Myerson).
Lemma 8. Let ci ∈ Ci; assume that there exists a dual vector α such that
ci /∈ Ci/αi and Cj/αj = Cj for all j in N\{i}. Then there exists a mixed
strategy σi in ∆(Ci) such that σi 6= ci and Ui(c−i, σi) ≥ Ui(c) for all c−i in
C−i.
Proof. Let σi = αi ∗ ci. Since for all j 6= i, every pure strategy in Cj is
αj-stationary, equation (3) yields:
Ui(c−i, σi) ≥ Ui(c) ∀c−i ∈ C−i
Furthermore, ci /∈ Ci/αi hence ci is not αi-stationary. Therefore σi 6= ci
We now prove the proposition. For every i in N , and every couple of pure
strategies (ci, di) in Ci × Ci, let
Hci,di :=

µ ∈ R
|C|,
∑
c−i∈C−i
µ(c)[Ui(c−i, di)− Ui(c)] = 0


5Here is a more formal statement: let n ≥ 2, let (m1, ...,mn) ∈ N
n and assume that
∏
j 6=i mj ≥ 2
for all i in {1, ..., n}. Then within the set of m1× ...×mn games, the set of games whose correlated
equilibrium polytope has dimension m1 × ...×mn − 2 has Lebesgue measure 0. The restriction to
games which are not essentially one-player games is needed, because in 2× 1 games, the correlated
equilibrium polytope has generically dimension 0 = 2− 2.
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Thus, di jeopardizes ci if and only if all correlated equilibria belong to Hci,di .
Generically, either a player has a strictly dominated strategy (case 1) or
the following properties are satisfied simultaneously (case 2):
σi 6= ci ⇒ ∃c−i ∈ C−i, Ui(c−i, σi) < Ui(c), ∀i ∈ N,∀ci ∈ Ci,∀σi ∈ ∆(Ci) (7)
Hci,di 6= Hcj ,dj , ∀i 6= j,∀(ci, di) ∈ Ci × Ci,∀(cj , dj) ∈ Cj × Cj (8)
so it suffices to examine these two cases.
Case 1 : let ci be strictly dominated. Then ci has marginal probability zero
in all correlated equilibria. The correlated equilibrium polytope may thus be
seen as a subset of ∆(Cˆ) with Cˆ = (Ci\{ci}) × C−i; therefore, its dimension
is at most (|Ci| − 1)× |C−i| = |C| − |C−i| − 1 < |C| − 2.
Case 2 : if the game is elementary, then the correlated equilibrium polytope
has dimension |C|−1 6= |C|−2. Otherwise, there exists a player i and a couple
of pure strategies (ci, di), with ci 6= di, such that di jeopardizes ci. That is,
every correlated equilibrium is in Hci,di . Therefore, by proposition 1, there
exists a dual vector α such that ci /∈ Ci/αi. Due to condition (7) and lemma
8, this implies that there exists j in N\{i} and cj in Cj such that cj /∈ Cj/αj .
It follows that cj is jeopardized by some strategy dj in Cj\{cj}. That is,
every correlated equilibrium is in Hcj ,dj . Therefore the correlated equilibrium
polytope is a subset of ∆(C) ∩Hci,di ∩Hcj,dj . It follows from (7) that Hci,di
and Hcj ,dj are proper subsets of R
|C|, and from (8) that they are distinct. As
an intersection of two distinct hyperplanes of R|C|, Hci,di ∩Hcj,dj is a vector
space of dimension |C| − 2. Its intersection with the simplex ∆(C) has at
most dimension |C| − 3 and it includes the correlated equilibrium polytope.
Therefore, this polytope has at most dimension |C| − 3. This completes the
proof.
4 Properties of dual reduction
The examples of applications given in the previous section suggest, at least to
us, that it might be worthwhile to study in greater depth the properties of dual
reduction. This is the object of this section. Section 4.1 shows that, though
positive affine transformations and other rescalings of the payoffs affect the
set of dual vectors, they do not change the ways in which a game may be
reduced. In section 4.2, we try to understand which kind of strategies are
eliminated in dual reductions. We show for instance that strategies with zero
probability in all correlated equilibria are eliminated in all full dual reductions,
but that this is not true of weakly dominated strategies. Section 4.3 studies
the properties of dual reduction in specific classes of games such as zero-sum
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games or symmetric games. Finally, section 4.4 shows that, in almost all 2-
player games, the process of iterative full dual reduction is uniquely defined.
4.1 Payoff rescaling and dual reduction
Let Γ and Γ′ be two games with the same sets of players and strategies. Let
U ′i denote the utility function of player i in Γ
′.
Definition 9. The game Γ′ is a rescaling of Γ if for every player i in N ,
there exists a positive constant ai and a function fi : C−i → R such that:
U ′i(c) = ai.Ui(c) + fi(c−i), ∀c ∈ C
If Γ′ is a rescaling of Γ, then Γ and Γ′ represent essentially the same
economic situation. So it is reassuring to note that they can be reduced in
the same ways:
Proposition 10. Let Γ′ be a rescaling of Γ. If α is a dual vector of Γ then
there exists a dual vector α′ of Γ′ such that Γ′/α′ = Γ′/α. That is, Γ′/α is a
dual reduction of Γ′.
This result would be obvious if a game and its rescalings had the same
dual vectors, but the following example shows that this is not the case.
Example 11.
x2 y2
x1 1,−1 −1, 1
y1 −1, 1 1,−1
x2 y2
x1 2,−1 −2, 1
y1 −2, 1 2,−1
Let Γ denote the game on the left (Matching Pennies) and Γ′ its rescaling on
the right. Define α by αi ∗xi = αi ∗ yi =
1
2xi+
1
2yi for every i in {1, 2}. Then
α is a dual vector for Γ but not for Γ′.
The key is that different vectors of deviation plans may induce the same
reduced game. For instance, in example 11, define α′ by α′1∗c1 =
1
2 (c1+α1∗c1)
for all c1 in {x1, y1}, and α
′
2 = α2. It may be checked that α
′ is a dual vector of
Γ′ and that α and α′ induce the same reduced game: Γ′/α′ = Γ′/α. Therefore,
even though α is not a dual vector of Γ′, Γ′/α is a dual reduction of Γ. We
now generalize this idea.
Lemma 12. Let αi be a deviation plan for player i. Let 0 < ǫ ≤ 1. Define
the deviation plan αǫi by α
ǫ
i ∗ ci = ǫ(αi ∗ ci) + (1− ǫ)ci. Then Ci/αi = Ci/α
ǫ
i .
Proof. For any mixed strategy σi in ∆(Ci), α
ǫ
i ∗ σi − σi = ǫ(αi ∗ σi − σi).
Therefore, αi and α
ǫ
i induce the same stationary strategies
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We can now prove proposition 10. The proof consists in showing that dual
vectors of Γ may be “rescaled” into dual vectors of Γ′. Let α be a dual vector
of Γ. Let ak = mini∈N ai and, for each i in N , let ǫi = ak/ai (the constants ai
are those of definition 9). Recall the definition of αǫi from lemma 12 and let
α′ = (αǫii )i∈N . For every c in C, let D
′(c, α′) =
∑
i∈N [U
′
i(c−i, α
′
i ∗ ci)−U
′
i(c)].
A simple computation shows that
D′(c, α′) = ak ×D(c, α) ≥ 0 ∀c ∈ C (9)
where the inequality follows from the fact that α is a dual vector of Γ. There-
fore α′ is a dual vector of Γ′. But lemma 12 implies that Γ′/α′ = Γ′/α. This
completes the proof.
4.2 Which strategies and equilibria are eliminated?
We say that the pure strategy ci is eliminated in the dual reduction Γ/α
if σi(ci) = 0 for all σi in Ci/αi. A pure strategy profile c is eliminated if
σ(c) = 0 for all σ in C/α; that is, if for some i in N , ci is eliminated. Finally,
a correlated equilibrium µ is eliminated if there is no correlated strategy of
Γ/α which induces µ in Γ. In this section, we try to understand which kind
of strategies and equilibria are eliminated in dual reductions.
A first remark is that, as shown by Myerson, if a pure strategy is weakly
dominated then there is a dual reduction which consists in eliminating this
strategy. In that sense, dual reduction generalizes elimination of dominated
strategies. However, this does not mean that weakly dominated strategies are
eliminated in all non-trivial dual reductions, not even in full dual reductions:
Example 13.
x2 y2
x1 1, 1 1, 0
y1 1, 0 0, 0
In the above game, µ is a correlated equilibrium if and only if y2 is not played
in µ. That is, µ(x1, y2) = µ(y1, y2) = 0. Therefore x1 and y1 jeopardize
each other. It follows that, in all full dual reductions, x1 and y1 are grouped
together, hence y1 is not eliminated.
By contrast, in full dual reductions, strategies that have marginal proba-
bility zero in all correlated equilibria are eliminated, and a similar result holds
for strategy profiles.
Proposition 14. Let c ∈ C (resp. ci ∈ Ci) be a pure strategy profile (resp.
pure strategy) with probability zero in all correlated equilibria. Then c (resp.
ci) is eliminated in all full dual reductions and in all elementary iterative dual
reductions.
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Proof. First consider elementary iterative dual reductions: if Γe is an ele-
mentary iterative dual reduction of Γ, it has a correlated equilibrium with
full support, which induces a correlated equilibrium of Γ. Therefore all pure
strategy profiles (resp. pure strategies) of Γ that have not been eliminated in
Γe have positive probability in some correlated equilibrium.6
Now consider full dual reductions. Let α be a dual vector. Let σ ∈ C/α.
By definition of C/α, αi ∗σi = σi for all i in N . Therefore, it follows from (2)
that
∑
c∈C σ(c)D(c, α) = 0. Since by definition of dual vectors, D(c, α) ≥ 0
for all c in C, this implies that
D(c, α) > 0⇒ σ(c) = 0.
Assume now that α is strong and full, and let c be a pure strategy profile
with probability zero in all correlated equilibria. Since α is a strong dual
vector, we have D(c, α) > 0 hence σ(c) = 0. Therefore, c is eliminated in
the dual reduction Γ/α. But since α is a full dual vector and since in all full
dual reductions, the same strategy profiles are eliminated, it follows that c is
eliminated in all full dual reductions.7
Finally, let ci be a pure strategy profile with marginal probability zero
in all correlated equilibria. For all c−i in C−i, c = (c−i, ci) has probability
zero in all correlated equilibria. Therefore, in a full dual reduction, (c−i, ci)
is eliminated for all c−i in C−i, whence ci itself is eliminated.
We now turn to equilibria. Let us say that in a dual reduction, a correlated
equilibrium µ is eliminated if there is no correlated strategy of the reduced
game which induces µ in the original game.
Proposition 15. Strict correlated equilibria cannot be eliminated, not even
in an iterative dual reduction.
Proof. If µ is a strict correlated equilibrium, a strategy that has positive
marginal probability in µ cannot be jeopardized by another strategy. It follows
that in any dual reduction of Γ, all pure strategies used in µ remain as pure
strategies. Furthermore, as the player’s options for deviating are more limited
in the reduced game than in Γ, µ is a fortiori a strict correlated equilibrium
of the reduced game. Inductively, in any iterative dual reduction of Γ, all
strategies used in µ are available and µ is still a strict correlated equilibrium.8
6I owe my understanding of this point to Roger Myerson.
7Since all full dual reductions eliminate the same strategies, they also eliminate the same strat-
egy profiles.
8The proof shows that a pure strategy that has positive marginal probability in some strict
correlated equilibrium can never be eliminated nor grouped with other strategies. This generalizes
the fact that elementary games cannot be reduced.
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By contrast, the following example shows that completely mixed Nash
equilibria may be eliminated in all nontrivial dual reductions:
x2 y2 z2
y1 2, 0 1, 1 −1,−1
z1 2, 0 −1,−1 1, 1
y2 z2
y1 1, 1 −1,−1
z1 −1,−1 1, 1
In the left game, playing each strategy with equal probability is a completely
mixed Nash equilibrium. However, the unique nontrivial dual reduction is the
game on the right, in which x2 and thus all completely mixed Nash equilibria of
the original game have been eliminated. (To see that the only nontrivial dual
reduction consists in eliminating x2, note that, for player 2, x2 is equivalent to
1
2y2+
1
2z2; this implies that y2 and z2 jeopardize x2. Furthermore, for any i in
{1, 2}, yi and zi must be stationary under any dual vector because they have
positive probability in a strict correlated equilibrium. The result follows.)
In the above example, the reduced game is obtained by eliminating a pure
strategy of player 2 which is redundant in the sense that it yields the same
payoffs to player 2 as another (mixed) strategy. More generally, let Γ′ =
{N, (C ′i)i∈N , (Ui)i∈N} be a game built on Γ by omitting some pure strategies.
Assume that the omitted strategies are redundant in the following sense:
∀i ∈ N,∀ci ∈ Ci\C
′
i,∃σi ∈ ∆(C
′
i),∀c−i ∈ C−i, Ui(c−i, ci) = Ui(c−i, σi) (10)
Then Γ′ is a dual reduction of Γ. (Indeed, for all i in N , let αi ∗ ci = σi
(defined in (10)) if ci /∈ C
′
i and αi ∗ci = ci otherwise; this defines a dual vector
α such that Γ/α = Γ′.) In particular, dual reduction allows to reduce any
game into its reduced normal form (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986).
We conclude this section by noting that the links between dual reduction,
elimination of unacceptable strategies (Myerson, 1986) and perfect correlated
equilibria (Dhillon and Mertens, 1996) are explored in (Viossat, 2005).
4.3 Dual reduction in specific classes of games
4.3.1 Two-player zero-sum games
It is easy to show that any dual reduction of a zero-sum game is a zero-sum
game with the same value. Furthermore, dual vectors may be built easily
from optimal strategies:
Proposition 16. Let Γ denote a two-player zero-sum game and α a profile
of deviation plans. If for all i = 1, 2 and for all ci in Ci, the mixed strategy
αi ∗ ci is an optimal strategy, then α is a dual vector.
Proof. Let c be a pure strategy profile. Since α1 ∗c1 is optimal, it follows that
U1(α1∗c1, c2) ≥ v, where v is the value of the game. Similarly, U2(c1, α2∗c2) ≥
15
−v. Therefore, U1(α1 ∗ c1, c2)+U2(c1, α2 ∗ c2) ≥ 0 = U1(c)+U2(c). Since this
holds for all c in C, it follows that α is a dual vector.
Corollary 17. For every Nash equilibrium σ of a zero-sum game, there exists
a dual reduction in which the reduced set of strategy profiles is the singleton
{σ}.
Proof. In the particular case of proposition 16 where αi ∗ ci = σi for every
player i and every ci in Ci, the only αi-stationary strategy is σi. Therefore,
the reduced set Ci/αi of pure strategies of player i is the singleton {σi}.
Proposition 18. Consider a two-player zero-sum game. In all full dual re-
ductions, for every player, all pure strategies with positive marginal probability
in at least one correlated equilibrium are grouped together and all other pure
strategies are eliminated.
Proof. Let Cci denote the set of pure strategies of player i with positive prob-
ability in at least one correlated equilibrium. Consider a full dual reduction.
The fact that strategies in Ci\C
c
i are eliminated follows from proposition
14. Furthermore, it follows from (Forges, 1990) that player i has an optimal
strategy with support Cci . Due to propositions 16 and 1, this implies that
all strategies in Cci jeopardize each other. Therefore, in a full dual reduction,
they are either all eliminated or all grouped together. The first case is ruled
out because all other strategies are eliminated. This completes the proof.
4.3.2 Games with a unique correlated equilibrium
If Γ has a unique Nash equilibrium σ, then any iterative dual reduction of
Γ has a unique Nash equilibrium, which induces σ in Γ; but the strategy
space need not be reducible to σ. In particular, it may be that a (nontrivial)
game has a unique, pure Nash equilibrium but is nevertheless elementary,
hence cannot be reduced. This is the case in example 4 of Nau and McCardle
(1990). By contrast:
Proposition 19. Assume that Γ has a unique correlated equilibrium σ (note
that σ is then a Nash equilibrium, hence may be seen as a mixed strategy
profile). In any full or elementary iterative dual reduction, the set of pure
strategy profiles is reduced to {σ}. In particular, Γ has a unique full dual
reduction.
Proof. The part of the proposition concerning elementary iterative dual re-
ductions follows from our elementary proof of the fact that a unique correlated
equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium (section 3). For full dual reductions, let Cci
denote the set of pure strategies of player i with positive probability in at least
one correlated equilibrium. Since there is a unique correlated equilibrium,
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which is thus a Nash equilibrium, all strategies in Cci trivially jeopardize each
other. Then apply the same argument as in the proof of proposition 18.
4.3.3 Games with symmetries
Let Γ be a two-player symmetric game. That is, C1 = C2 = {1, 2, ...,m}
and for all (k, l) in {1, 2, ...,m}2 , U1(k, l) = U2(l, k). If α = (α1, α2) is a
dual vector, then so are α′ = (α2, α1) and α¯ = (α + α
′)/2. Moreover, Γ/α¯
is symmetric. This section shows that, more generally, if a game has some
symmetries (e.g. cyclic symmetry), then it may be reduced in a way which
respect these symmetries.
Let P be a set of permutations of the set of players. Let Γ be a game for
which, for every i in N and every permutation p in P , player i and player p(i)
have the same set of pure strategies. For every c in C and every permutation
p in P , define the pure strategy profile cp by cpp(i) = ci for every i in N .
Definition 20. The game Γ is p-symmetric if, for all i in N , Up(i)(c
p) =
Ui(c). It is P -symmetric if it is p-symmetric for every p in P .
Proposition 21. If Γ is P -symmetric then there exists a strong and full dual
vector α such that Γ/α is P -symmetric.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that P is the largest set of permu-
tations such that Γ is P -symmetric. Note that for any permutations p and
p˜, if Γ is both p- and p˜-symmetric then it is p˜ ◦ p-symmetric. Therefore, by
maximality of P ,
∀p˜ ∈ P, {p˜ ◦ p, p ∈ P} = P (11)
Let α be a strong and full dual vector. For every permutation p in P , define
the dual vector αp by αpp(i) = αi for every i in N . Let
α¯ =
∑
p∈P α
p
|P |
Let p in P . Due to (11), α¯p = α¯, so that for every i in N , α¯p(i) = α¯
p
p(i) = α¯i. It
follows that for any i in N , Cp(i)/α¯p(i) = Ci/α¯i and that Γ/α¯ is p-symmetric.
Therefore Γ/α¯ is P -symmetric. Finally, since α is a strong and full dual
vector, so is α¯. This concludes the proof.
4.3.4 Generic 2× 2 games
Let Γ be a 2× 2 game such that
c 6= c′ ⇒ Ui(c) 6= Ui(c
′), ∀(c, c′) ∈ C2,∀i ∈ {1, 2}
It is well known that such a game is either elementary, in which case it cannot
be reduced, or has a unique correlated equilibrium distribution, in which case
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proposition 19 applies. The first case corresponds to coordination-like games,
with three Nash equilibria: two pure and one completely mixed; the second
case to games with either a dominating strategy or a unique, completely mixed
Nash equilibrium. The games in Myerson’s figures 3 and 5 are instances of
the second case.
4.4 Uniqueness of the reduction process
Let Γ denote the rather trivial game:
x2 y2
x1 1, 1 0, 1
Let ǫ ∈]0, 1[. Define the full dual vector αǫ by αǫ2∗x2 = α
ǫ
2∗y2 = ǫx2+(1−ǫ)y2.
In the full dual reduction Γ/αǫ, there is a unique pure strategy profile whose
payoffs (ǫ, 1) depend on ǫ. Thus, even if only full dual reductions are used,
there might still be multiple ways to reduce a game. Other examples (omitted)
suggest however that multiplicity of full dual reductions typically arises when
a player is indifferent between some of his strategies, or becomes so after
elimination of strategies of the other players. Such indifference is a non-
generic phenomenon and we show below that almost all two-player games
have a unique sequence of iterative full dual reductions. We first show that
there are severe restrictions on the ways strategies may be grouped together.
Notation: for all i in N , let Bi ⊂ Ci and let B = ×i∈NBi. We denote by
ΓB = (N, (Bi)i∈N , (Ui)i∈N ) the game obtained from Γ by reducing the pure
strategy set of player i to Bi, for all i in N .
Proposition 22. Let α be a dual vector. For each i in N , let Bi ⊂ Ci denote
a minimal αi-absorbing set and B = ×i∈NBi. Let σBi denote the unique αi-
stationary strategy of player i with support in Bi and σB = (σBi)i∈N . We
have: σB is a completely mixed Nash equilibrium of ΓB.
Proof. The proof draws on the remark made by Myerson at the end of the
proof of his lemma 2. Since Bi is αi-absorbing, we may define α
′
i : Bi → ∆(Bi)
by α′i ∗ ci = αi ∗ ci for all ci in Bi. Since α is a dual vector of Γ, it follows
that α′ is a dual vector of ΓB. Moreover, B/α
′ = {σB}, hence σB is a
Nash equilibrium of ΓB/α
′. This implies that σB is a Nash equilibrium of
ΓB . Finally, by minimality of Bi, the support of σBi is exactly Bi so σB is
completely mixed.
Corollary 23. Assume that for every product B = ×i∈NBi of subsets Bi of
Ci, ΓB has at most one completely mixed Nash equilibrium. Then Γ has a
unique full dual reduction.
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Proof. Let α and α′ be two full dual vectors. Let σ ∈ C/α. Let Bi denote the
support of σi (seen as an element of ∆(Ci)) and let B = ×i∈NBi. Note that,
as the support of an αi-stationnary strategy, Bi is a minimal αi-absorbing set.
Since full dual vectors have the same minimal absorbing sets, it follows that
Bi is also a minimal α
′
i-absorbing set. Therefore, there exists τ in C/α
′ such
that τi has support Bi, for all i in N . By proposition 22, both σ and τ are
completely mixed Nash equilibria of ΓB. By assumption, this implies σ = τ ,
hence σ ∈ C ′/α. Therefore C/α = C/α′.
In the remainder of this section, Γ is a two-player game. Consider the
following conditions (which are satisfied by almost all two-player games) :
(a) for all Nash equilibria σ, the supports of σ1 and σ2 have the same
number of elements9
(b) any game obtained from Γ by deleting some pure strategies satisfies
(a)
(c) for any i in {1, 2}, for any Bi ⊂ Ci, B−i ⊂ C−i and B
′
−i ⊂ C−i,
with |Bi| = |B−i| = |B
′
−i| ≥ 2 and B−i ∩ B
′
−i = ∅, we have: if σ and σ
′
are completely mixed Nash equilibria of ΓBi×B−i and ΓBi×B′−i , respectively,
then σi 6= σ
′
i. That is, the same mixed strategy of player i cannot be the
i-component of a completely mixed Nash equilibrium both in ΓBi×B−i and in
ΓBi×B′−i .
Proposition 24. If Γ satisfies condition (b), then Γ has a unique full dual
reduction.
Proof. It suffices to show that condition (b) implies the assumption of corol-
lary 23. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that there exists B =
B1 × B2 ⊂ C1 × C2 such that ΓB has two distinct completely mixed Nash
equilibria σ and τ . Without loss of generality, assume σ1 6= τ1. There exists
λ in R such that σλ1 := λσ1 + (1− λ)τ1 is in ∆(C1) but its support is a strict
subset of the support of σ1. Since ΓB is a bimatrix game and σ and τ are
completely mixed (in ΓB), it follows that (σ
λ
1 , σ2) is a Nash equilibrium of ΓB .
But so is σ. Therefore, for at least one of these equilibria, the supports of
the strategies of the players do not have the same number of elements, hence
condition (b) is not satisfied.
Proposition 25. If Γ satisfies conditions (b) and (c), then there are only
three possibilities:
1 Γ is elementary
2 In all dual reductions of Γ, some strategies are eliminated, but no strate-
gies are grouped together.
9Any game which is nondegenerate in the sense of von Stengel (2002, def. 2.6 and thm 2.10)
satisfies this condition.
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3 In any full dual reduction of Γ, the reduced strategy space C/α is a
singleton.
Proof. Assume that Γ is not elementary and let α be a nontrivial dual vector.
Assume that some strategies of player 1 (for instance) are grouped together.
That is, there exists a minimal α1-absorbing set B1 with at least two ele-
ments. Let B2 and B
′
2 be minimal α2-absorbing sets. Let σB1 denote the
α1-stationary strategy with support in B1. Define σB2 and σB′
2
similarly. By
proposition 22, (σB1 , σB2) and (σB1 , σB′
2
) are Nash equilibria of ΓB1×B2 and
ΓB1×B′2 , respectively. Due to conditions (b) and (c), this implies B2 = B
′
2.
Therefore, there is a unique minimal α2-absorbing set: B2. That is, C2/α2
is a singleton. Moreover, due to condition (b), B1 and B2 have the same
number of elements. Thus B2 has at least two elements. Therefore, by the
above reasoning, C1/α1 is also a singleton and we are done.
If Γ satisfies condition (b), then any game obtained by deleting some pure
strategies of Γ obviously satisfies condition (b). Therefore, proposition 25
implies that:
Corollary 26. If Γ satisfies conditions (b) and (c), then so does any dual
reduction of Γ.
Putting proposition 24 and corollary 26 together, we get
Theorem 27. If Γ satisfies conditions (b) and (c), then Γ has a unique
sequence of iterative full dual reductions.
A Proof of proposition 6
Let Γ be pretight. Let α be a strong and full dual vector. Note that by
definition of pretight games, for any i in N , all strategies of Cci jeopardize
each other. Since α is full, this implies that in Γ/α there is a unique pure
strategy profile {σ}, which is a Nash equilibrium of Γ with support ×i∈NC
c
i
(the argument is the same as in the proof of proposition 18). Moreover, since
α is strong, it follows from the proof of lemma 3 that any pure strategy in
Ci\C
c
i is not a best-response to σ−i. Since σi has support C
c
i , this implies
that σ is quasi-strict.
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